Execution Team
7 of 19 evaluating perspectives (Lee Kuan Yew, Bukele, Musk, VCs, Unicorns, Oppenheimer, VisualPolitik) identified the same critical flaw: no execution team defined. Severity: 3/10 (CRITICAL). A plan without a team is a document. A plan with a team is an organization.
The YC Analogy
Y Combinator invests in teams, not ideas. The Venezuela S.A. plan is the idea — this chapter is the team slide.
As Garry Tan said: "Who is the CEO? Who is the CTO? If you can't answer that, you don't have a company — you have a PDF."
The plan has a thesis, projections, sources, and structure. What is missing is what turns documents into organizations: names, commitments, and accountability.
This section does not name people — that is an operational task. It defines the roles, profiles, selection process, and accountability framework so that when the time comes, the structure already exists.
Organizational Structure
This structure complements the execution org chart (PMO) and aligns with the sovereign fund governance. The Executive Board reports to both the Fund Council and citizens.
Required Profiles by Role
| Role | Required Profile | Minimum Experience | Ideal Origin | Example Profile (not people) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CEO | Former CEO of large corporation or sovereign fund | 15+ years executive leadership, bilingual ES/EN | Venezuelan diaspora or international with country connection | Someone who has managed USD 1B+ operations with public accountability |
| Oil Director | Former VP of major oil company or energy consultancy | 15+ years in upstream/midstream, Orinoco Belt knowledge | Former pre-2002 PDVSA, Rystad, IHS, Wood Mackenzie | Profile that understands both geology and international JVs |
| Finance Director | Former MD of investment bank or sovereign restructuring | 12+ years in sovereign debt, emerging markets | Wall Street, City of London, with LATAM experience | Someone who has led USD 10B+ debt restructurings |
| Tech/Digital Director | Former CTO/VP of BigTech or successful founder | 10+ years in cloud infrastructure, data centers, digital government | Silicon Valley, Europe, willing to relocate | Profile that has scaled platforms with millions of users |
| Human Capital Director | Former education minister or president of major university | 12+ years in educational reform or large-scale talent management | LATAM or international with crisis-system experience | Someone who has transformed national education systems |
| Security/Legal Director | Former leader of police/military reform | 10+ years in institutional security reform | Experience with Georgia, Colombia, or Chile models | Profile that has reduced organized crime with verifiable metrics |
| Board (5-7) | Multidisciplinary mix with corporate governance | 10+ years on boards of public companies or funds | 3+ diaspora, 2+ local, 1-2 international | Profiles with track record in transparency and accountability |
| Advisory Council | World-class experts by domain | International recognition in their field | Global, pro bono or compensated | Academics, former sovereign fund officials, former CEOs |
10 Non-Negotiable Criteria
Every candidate for any executive position must meet all 10 without exception:
| # | Criterion | Verification |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Non-partisan — no active political affiliation | Sworn declaration + public verification |
| 2 | No ties to regimes — neither current nor past | Independent investigation |
| 3 | Verifiable track record — public CV, auditable achievements | Vetting committee + due diligence |
| 4 | Financial disclosure — declared net worth upon entry | Published on citizen dashboard |
| 5 | Minimum 5-year commitment — no executive tourism | Binding contract with penalties |
| 6 | No conflicts of interest — neither direct nor indirect | Business relationship audit |
| 7 | Bilingual — Spanish + English minimum | Interview in both languages |
| 8 | Willing to relocate — based in Venezuela | Contractual residency commitment |
| 9 | International background check — FCPA/UK Bribery Act standard | External due diligence firm |
| 10 | Public commitment — visible names and faces | Public presentation + citizen access |
Venezuela has had decades of officials without accountability. The plan's anti-corruption framework applies with maximum rigor to these roles. No exceptions, no "temporary flexibilities."
Selection Process
| Phase | Duration | Responsible | Output |
|---|---|---|---|
| Nomination | 60 days | Civil society coalition + diaspora | Long list of 50-100 candidates |
| Vetting | 90 days | Independent committee (3 Venezuelans + 2 international) | Short list of 15-20 candidates |
| Public shortlist | 30 days | Citizen digital platform | Public feedback, documented objections |
| Appointment | 30 days | Democratic mechanism (to be defined) | Executive team named |
| Review | Annual | Board + Citizen Assembly | Continuity, adjustment, or removal |
Compensation Model
Lee Kuan Yew paid his ministers salaries competitive with the private sector — USD 1M+ annually. His argument: "Pay them well or lose them to the private sector, or worse, to corruption." The NBIM (Norway sovereign fund) model follows the same logic [Requires research].
| Component | Structure | Reference |
|---|---|---|
| Base salary | Competitive with international private sector (75th percentile) | Korn Ferry/Mercer benchmarks for emerging markets [Requires research] |
| Performance bonus | 0-100% of base salary, tied to quarterly public KPIs | Model similar to Norwegian sovereign fund CEO (NBIM) |
| Symbolic equity | Equivalent citizen bonds — their compensation rises if Venezuela rises | Startup-style incentive alignment |
| Clawback | Total return of bonuses if misconduct, corruption, or undisclosed conflict of interest is detected | Dodd-Frank standard for public company executives |
| Pension | Standard contributory — no lifetime privilege pensions | Estonia/Singapore model |
Recruitment Pipeline
| Channel | Estimated Pool | Strategy |
|---|---|---|
| Venezuelan diaspora | 7.9M people (UNHCR, Dec. 2025) — thousands in global leadership positions | Activation via professional networks in US, Spain, Colombia, Chile |
| International headhunting | Firms such as Egon Zehnder, Spencer Stuart, Heidrick & Struggles | Specific mandate with non-negotiable criteria |
| Multilaterals | World Bank, IDB, CAF — institutional reform talent pools | Formal partnerships for secondments |
| Venezuelan professional networks | Harvard Venezuela Project, VenAmerica, IESA Alumni, etc. | Recruitment ambassadors in each network |
| Local talent | Community leaders, surviving entrepreneurs, professionals who stayed | Parallel process — not all solutions come from outside |
The team cannot be diaspora-only. Those who stayed have irreplaceable ground knowledge. The target: minimum 40% of the expanded team must be local talent. Reconstruction is not imposed from outside.
Accountability Framework
| Mechanism | Frequency | Audience | Consequence |
|---|---|---|---|
| KPI Dashboard | Quarterly | Public (40M citizens) | Total transparency — anyone can audit |
| Management Report | Semi-annual | Board + Citizen Assembly | Public questions, mandatory answers |
| Independent Audit | Annual | International firm (Big Four + local auditor) | Full publication of results |
| 360-Degree Review | Annual | Peers, subordinates, Board, citizens | Input for continuity decisions |
| Automatic Removal Triggers | Continuous | Executive Board | 2 consecutive quarters without meeting KPIs, integrity violation, undisclosed conflict of interest |
No member of the executive team has judicial immunity. The Attorney General — who never reports to the executive — has full jurisdiction. This is not government; it is an organization with shareholders who demand results.
Connection to the Plan
| Plan Section | Relationship with the Execution Team |
|---|---|
| Sovereign Fund | The Executive Board coordinates with the Fund Council — parallel governance |
| ESG and Execution (PMO) | The PMO org chart integrates under the execution team CEO |
| Anti-corruption | The 10 non-negotiable criteria are the executive version of the anti-corruption checklist |
| Timeline | Phase A (2027-2031) requires the full team before launch |
| Diaspora | Primary source of talent for leadership roles |
Reference Profiles: Who Has Done This Before
This isn't about hiring these people. It's about recruiting equivalent profiles — people who have done exactly this in another context.
Role 0: CEO / General Administrator of Venezuela S.A.
LKY (7.5/10): "You have a CRO, a lawyer, a China negotiator, an IMF representative, and a comms director — but who do they report to? A startup with five VPs and zero CEO is a committee, and committees don't rebuild nations."
The CEO is who leads the execution of the entire plan. Not a politician — a world-class executive who operates Venezuela S.A. as a USD 500B+ corporate holding with 40M shareholders.
| Reference profile | Verified achievement | Relevance to Venezuela |
|---|---|---|
| Kakha Bendukidze (historical model) — Russian-Georgian entrepreneur -> Minister of Reform, Georgia 2004 | Georgia from 137th to 11th in Ease of Doing Business. 12% flat tax. Eliminated 90% of licenses. Said: "Sell everything except honor" | The exact archetype. Successful entrepreneur who accepts the challenge of rebuilding a state. Not a career politician, not a bureaucrat — an executor with a track record |
| Profile type: Former CEO of sovereign fund or extractive corporation in an emerging market | Management of USD 10B+ operations, multiple countries, public accountability. Bilingual. Willing to relocate | Profile types: former CEO of Equinor (Norwegian NOC), former Director of Temasek (Singapore state holding), former CEO of LATAM operation of a major oil company |
| Profile type: Founder/CEO of LATAM unicorn with regulatory experience | Someone who has built a USD 1B+ company in LATAM navigating complex regulation, informality, and country risk | Profile types: founders of Nubank, MercadoLibre, Globant — they understand scale, regulation, and capital in LATAM |
Compensation: 95th percentile of the market (not 75th). LKY paid USD 1M+ to his ministers. For a CEO managing USD 500B+ in assets, compensation must be competitive with sovereign fund CEOs (NBIM: ~USD 1-2M/year + performance bonus). See compensation model.
Role 1: Chief Restructuring Officer (CRO) / Financial Director
The CRO negotiates with creditors, structures oil forwards, and designs the plan's financial architecture. Must have restructured sovereign debt of USD 10B+.
| Reference profile | Verified achievement | Relevance to Venezuela |
|---|---|---|
| David Martínez — Founder, Fintech Advisory (Mexico/London) | Participated in nearly every sovereign restructuring of the last 25 years. Bought Argentine distressed debt at discount, then participated in exchanges. Net worth ~USD 3B | Understands LATAM distressed debt. Fintech Advisory handles exactly the instruments Venezuela needs (forwards, bonds, swaps) |
| Martín Guzmán — Ex-Minister of Economy, Argentina. Professor, Columbia SIPA | Led the 2nd largest sovereign restructuring in history (USD 65B, 2020). ~45% NPV haircut in 6 months. Negotiated with IMF (deal Jan 2022) | Direct experience negotiating with bondholders, IMF, and Paris Club. Co-director of sovereign debt program with Stiglitz |
| Simón Cueva — Ex-Minister of Economy, Ecuador. Ex-IMF economist. LinkedIn | Restructured USD 17.4B in sovereign debt (2020). Saved USD 11.3B over 5 years. Renegotiated Chinese debt (~USD 4B, 2022). Completed IMF program | Ecuador is the closest case to Venezuela: oil-dependent, Chinese debt, IMF necessity. His playbook is directly replicable |
| Mark Walker — Senior MD, Guggenheim Securities. Ex-Global Managing Partner, Cleary Gottlieb | Co-authored with Hausmann 3 papers on Venezuela's restructuring. Advised 20+ sovereigns (Colombia, Peru, Mexico, Philippines, Indonesia). Member of the Bretton Woods Committee | Literally wrote the playbook for Venezuela's restructuring. A natural bridge between the CRO function and IMF negotiation |
| Richard Martínez — Senior Advisor, Alvarez & Marsal. Ex-Minister of Finance, Ecuador. LinkedIn | Led Ecuador's USD 17B restructuring. Renegotiated USD 3.2B in Chinese debt. Secured USD 6.5B EFF with IMF. Ex-VP of the IDB | Complements Cueva (they were colleagues on Ecuador's economic team). Now at A&M Sovereign Advisory — directly in the business of doing this on contract |
Reference advisory firms:
- Lazard Sovereign Advisory — Advised Argentina, Ecuador, Suriname, Zambia, Ghana, Sri Lanka. Thomas Moatti (Director) had advisory role with Venezuela 2012-2013
- Houlihan Lokey — David-Alexandre Gadmer (ex-Lazard) heads sovereign advisory. Aggressive new entrant
- Rothschild & Co — Alternative to Lazard with track record in African and Asian restructurings
Role 2: International Legal Advisor
Handles ICSID (USD 20B+ in pending arbitrations against Venezuela), structures VIN (National Investment Securities), and negotiates with OFAC.
| Reference profile | Verified achievement | Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| Lee Buchheit — Ex-partner, Cleary Gottlieb | Invented Collective Action Clauses (CACs). Led restructurings for 20+ countries including Iraq and Greece. Financial Times "Top 10 Innovative Individuals" 2012 | The gold standard in sovereign restructuring. His CAC framework is what Venezuela would use to force consensus among bondholders |
| Kenneth Figueroa — Partner, Foley Hoag | Represented Venezuela at ICSID for 10+ years. Crystallex case (USD 1.4B). Victory in multiple arbitrations (Anglo American USD 400M, Highbury USD 633M) | Knows ALL ICSID cases against Venezuela. Knows where the vulnerabilities and strengths of the defense lie |
| Ian Clark — Partner, White & Case | Advised on restructurings in Argentina, Ecuador, Greece, Ukraine, Suriname, Zambia, Sri Lanka | One of the most experienced sovereign debt lawyers in the world. White & Case published the leading analysis on LATAM restructurings |
| Anna Gelpern — Professor, Georgetown Law. Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute | Co-authored the IDB paper "Sovereign Debt Restructuring: The Need for a New Approach". Mentor to the next generation of sovereign debt lawyers | Bridge between academia and practice. Complements Buchheit (her mentor) with a modern perspective on the Common Framework and G20 architecture |
Reference firms for Venezuela:
- Cleary Gottlieb — Advised Ecuador in 2020 restructuring. Global leader in sovereign debt
- Foley Hoag — Represented Venezuela at ICSID for 10+ years (38 cases in LATAM)
- King & Spalding — Represented ConocoPhillips in ICSID arbitration vs. Venezuela (USD 8B award). Know the other side of the table
Role 3: Bilateral China Negotiator
Venezuela owes ~USD 19B to China (oil-for-loans). This role negotiates the restructuring of that debt and the transition of the bilateral relationship.
| Reference profile | Verified achievement | Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| Margaret Myers — Director, Asia & Latin America Program, Inter-American Dialogue | Created China-LATAM lending database. Advises U.S. government on China-LATAM relations. Testified before U.S. Congress | The leading Western expert on China-LATAM finance. Knows the structure of oil-for-loans and how they've been renegotiated in Ecuador |
| Kevin Gallagher — Director, BU Global Development Policy Center. Author of The China Triangle: Latin America's China Boom | Co-created the China-LATAM finance database with Myers. Lead advisor on MDB reform for Brazil's G20 presidency | Understands both the political economy and the financial architecture of Chinese lending in LATAM. Complements Myers (she maps, he negotiates) |
| Rebecca Ray — Senior Researcher, BU Global Development Policy Center. LinkedIn | Leads the annual China-LAC Economic Bulletin. Expertise in debt-for-climate swaps | The most comprehensive tracking of Chinese development finance in LATAM. Debt-for-climate swaps are relevant to Venezuela's transition narrative |
Role 4: IMF / Multilateral Representative
Negotiates the IMF program (likely Extended Fund Facility), coordinates with IDB, CAF, World Bank.
| Reference profile | Verified achievement | Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| Alejandro Werner — Ex-Director WHD, IMF. Founding Director, Georgetown Americas Institute | Directed IMF's Americas department (2013-2021). Oversaw programs in Argentina, Ecuador, Colombia. Ex-Undersecretary of Finance of Mexico | Knows the IMF's internal kitchen for LATAM. Knows which conditions are negotiable and which aren't. Direct connections to IMF board |
| Ricardo Hausmann — Director, Growth Lab, Harvard Kennedy School. Ex-Minister of Planning of Venezuela (1992-93) | Created the Atlas of Economic Complexity. Advised dozens of governments. In 2026, actively involved in Venezuela reconstruction debate | Venezuelan. Understands the country like no one else in international academia. His credibility with IMF, World Bank, and IDB is unique. Ideal role: strategic advisor, not operator — complements Werner who operates in Washington |
| Rodrigo Valdés — Current WHD Director, IMF. Ex-Minister of Finance of Chile. PhD MIT | Directed the IMF's WHD (2023-2025) during the exact period when Venezuela would need a program. Previously: Chief Economist LATAM at Barclays | Most up-to-date IMF institutional knowledge compared to Werner. Chilean — neutral but deeply familiar with LATAM fiscal challenges |
Role 5: Communications Director
Manages the simultaneous narrative for 3 audiences: citizens (40M), international investors, and geopolitical actors.
| Reference profile | Verified achievement | Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| Paul Caminiti — Founding Partner, Reevemark | Former federal prosecutor turned restructuring communications specialist. Reevemark is consistently top-ranked in restructuring comms | Handles exactly the intersection of bondholder negotiation, public sentiment, and media management that Venezuela's restructuring requires |
| Alternative firm: Kekst CNC or FGS Global | The two largest financial communications firms in the world with explicit restructuring practice. FGS has bilingual LATAM capability (Miami/DC) | For a restructuring of Venezuela's scale (USD 150B+, 40M citizens, geopolitical complexity), the comms function likely needs a firm, not a single individual |
Historical Model: Georgia 2004 (Saakashvili)
The most relevant case for Venezuela S.A. — a collapsed country that reinvented itself in 4 years:
| Role | Person | Achievement | Lesson for Venezuela |
|---|---|---|---|
| President | Mikheil Saakashvili | Rose Revolution → radical state reform | Political leadership necessary but not sufficient. Needed technical team |
| Minister of Reform | Kakha Bendukidze | Georgia jumped from 137th to 11th in Ease of Doing Business (World Bank). 12% flat tax. Eliminated 90% of licenses | Georgia's CRO. Successful entrepreneur → reform minister. Said: "The government should sell everything except its honor." Exactly the philosophy of Venezuela S.A. |
| Fiscal advisor | Simeon Djankov (World Bank) + Leszek Balcerowicz (Poland) | Designed tax and customs reforms | International expertise + local implementation. Same model the plan proposes |
In every successful case of national restructuring (Georgia 2004, Singapore 1965, Chile 1975-90, Estonia 1991, Rwanda 2000), the team had 3 characteristics: (1) world-class technical expertise, (2) sufficient political legitimacy, (3) protection from political interference during the critical first 5 years. Venezuela S.A. designs exactly this.
This section is deliberately a framework with references, not names. The first real milestone of Venezuela S.A. is converting these references into recruits. When the Board has names, signed commitments, and published KPIs, the plan transitions from document to organization. Until then, it is a PDF — and PDFs do not rebuild countries.
The USD 25-60M Pre-Seed funds the recruitment. With USD 5M you hire Egon Zehnder or Spencer Stuart for a 6-month mandate: find the 7 executive roles + 5-7 board members from the diaspora and international talent. The rest of the Pre-Seed funds the platform, digital census, and legal.